“Omnipotence.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/omnipotence. Retrieved 9 November 2022. That`s why the Smiths are an incredible band, because Morrissey will write lyrics in two lines that range from incredible omnipotence to simply overwhelming self-hatred. Flint and Freddoso`s account of what it means for an agent (S) at a time (t) to be omnipotent in a possible world (W) is formulated as follows. Philosophical reflection on the notion of omnipotence raises many puzzling questions about whether or not a coherent notion of omnipotence limits the power of an omnipotent agent. Could an all-powerful agent create a stone so massive that that agent can`t move it? Paradoxically, it seems that, whatever the answer to this question, an all-powerful agent turns out not to be omnipotent. Could such an agent have the power to create or overturn the necessary truths of logic and mathematics? Could such an agent provoke or change the past? Is the idea of an all-powerful agent other than God understandable? Could two omnipotent agents coexist? If there are conditions that an all-powerful actor cannot achieve, how can the concept of omnipotence be clearly defined? Moreover, an obstacle to traditional Western theism arises when it is impossible for God to be morally perfect and omnipotent. If an almighty God is powerless to do evil, how can He be omnipotent? Rational theology seeks an analysis of the concept of omnipotence that provides enough granularity about the powers of an omnipotent agent to solve the apparent riddles and paradoxes surrounding this concept. If the notion of omnipotence were deemed incomprehensible or incompatible with moral perfection, then traditional Western theism would be wrong. Moreover, it can be plausibly argued that the power to create an infinite number of states does not imply omnipotence. For example, intuitively, an agent who has the power to move a feather in one of the countless positions, but does not have the power to move a heavy rock, would not be omnipotent, although he has the power to cause an infinite number of states. The second possibility is that Cain`s decision to do evil is caused by nothing but Cain and is free in the libertarian sense.
In this case, God did not cause Cain to make (E) exist freely, whereas [suppose] Cain freely realized that (E) exists. If so, then it must be true that God`s creation of Cain and allowing Cain to do what he wants to do [in the context of all creation] does more good than not creating Cain and therefore does not allow him to do what he wants to do. It could be objected that if Cain can cause a state that God cannot cause, namely that E exists, then God is not omnipotent. But as we have seen, the omnipotence of an agent does not require that this agent be able to cause a state that another agent can cause. This requires, of course, that an all-powerful agent has more power than any other agent. And, of course, God would have more power than Cain, although Cain could do something that God could not. For there are many more conditions that God could bring and that Cain could not bring than the reverse. At this point, it could be objected that an omnipotent actor, who was morally imperfect, who could bring into existence, as well as all the other states that God could provoke, would be more powerful than God.
But remember that if God exists, He exists eternally in every possible world. Also remember that apparently there can be no more than one omnipotent agent. So it seems that if God exists, an omnipotent actor who is morally flawed is impossible. So this second objection is based on a seemingly impossible assumption, namely that if God exists, there could be another omnipotent actor who is morally flawed and therefore more powerful than God. The attempt to develop a theory to explain, attribute or reject omnipotence for reasons of logic has little value, because to be omnipotent in the Cartesian sense would mean that the omnipotent being is above logic, a view supported by René Descartes. [21] He advances this idea in his meditations on early philosophy. This view is called universal possibilism. [22] The concept of updating used in this report on omnipotence requires some explanation.
If an agent (S) causes a state, (p), update (S) (p). However, this representation assumes that an agent can [weakly] update the free decision of another agent without provoking or provoking that decision. In particular, it is believed that an agent can weakly implement a decision that is free in the libertarian sense by provoking the precursor of a true “counterfactual fact of freedom”. It has been argued that the traditional God has incompatible qualities, namely necessary existence, essential omnipotence, essential omniscience, and essential moral perfection (Pike 1969). [7] The claim was that it is impossible for God to have the power to cause evil, whereas non-omnipotent (and morally imperfect) beings can have that power. The exact form of such an argument varies according to the precision with which the relationship between God and evil is assumed. In general, however, it is held that divine moral perfection and omnipotence are incompatible, because divine omnipotence implies that God has the power to cause evil, while divine moral perfection means that God is powerless to cause evil. Nglish: Translation of omnipotence for Spanish language Sigmund Freud used the same term freely in a similar way.
Referring to an adult neurotic, Freud referred to “the omnipotence he attributed to his thoughts and feelings” and said that “this belief is an open recognition of a relic of the ancient megalomania of childhood.” [10] Similarly, Freud concluded that “we can see an element of megalomania in most other forms of paranoid disorder. We rightly assume that this megalomania is essentially infantile in nature and is sacrificed to social considerations as development progresses. [11] Freud saw megalomania as an obstacle to psychoanalysis. In the second half of the 20th century, the theory of object relations, both in the United States and among British Kleinians, set out to “rethink megalomania.” the intention to transform an obstacle. in a complex organization that links object relations and defense mechanisms in such a way that it opens up new “therapeutic perspectives”. [12] Many people I have interviewed in such a position, and I think, especially men, carry a kind of aura of omnipotence. Would it strengthen such a defense to further require that coexisting all-powerful agents necessarily be aesthetically perfect and therefore not discuss what is aesthetically required or whether they want to act that way? This does not appear to be the case. Finally, there appear to be incompatible, contingent, aesthetically optional situations, i.e. conditions that are neither aesthetically required nor aesthetically prohibited for an agent, and considerations corresponding to those mentioned above apply. Moreover, it is not clear that futile struggle necessarily has a negative aesthetic value, see, for example, Camus`s The Myth of Sisyphus, and in any case it can be plausibly argued that equipping opposing forces can have positive aesthetic value, implying that the opposing voluntary activities of coexisting omnipotent beings would not necessarily be useless. Videos like the one Jammeh depicts at the TRRC undermine the myth of his omnipotence, says Baba Galleh Jallow, executive secretary of the TRRC and himself a former satirist. Because of the great divergence between the contingent states, (a)-(f), one might despair of finding an analysis of omnipotence that satisfactorily treats all these states and implies that an omnipotent being intuitively has sufficient power.
Is such pessimism justified or can omnipotence be analyzed? This argument against the possibility of accidental omnipotence presupposes traditional Western theism. However, traditional Western theism is highly controversial, and neutrality as to whether God exists has certain advantages. If one is neutral as to whether God exists, then one should not assume that omnipotence is attributable solely to the God of traditional Western theism or only to an essentially omnipotent being. Some monotheists reject the idea that a deity is or could be omnipotent, or argue that a deity, in choosing to create creatures of free will, has chosen to limit divine omnipotence. In Conservative and Reform Judaism and some movements within Protestant Christianity, including open theism, it is said that deities in the world act by persuasion rather than coercion (this is a matter of choice – a deity could act miraculously, and perhaps sometimes does – whereas for procedural theism, It is a matter of necessity – creatures have inherent powers, which a deity cannot do, even crush in principle). Deities manifest themselves in the world through inspiration and the creation of possibilities, not necessarily through miracles or violations of the laws of nature. [17] [18] Power rests on God not as something truly different from His knowledge and will, but as logically different from them; inasmuch as power implies the idea of a principle that puts into practice what the will commands and what guides knowledge, three things are identified in God.
